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COAS and White House Ambassadors briefed this afternoon by

Assistant Secretaries Martin and Hilsman on Cuban crisis. Hilsman reported yesterday's overflights showed medium range missile sites have been dismantled, with missiles, erectors and camouflage removed and some sites bulldozed and flattened. Present whereabouts equipment removed not determined. On intermediate range sites construction stopped with one launch pad already broken up and second pad demolition started but not advanced. Nuclear head bunkers also being removed.

Martin described solution of problem offensive weapons in three stages. First is removal or destruction of weapons in Cuba by Soviets as agreed. Second involves UN inspection to confirm ~~confirm~~ first phase completed. Third contemplates measures prevent re-establishment offensive capability in Cuba. Inspection procedures involve all three stages. Inspection first phase involves re-establishing our quarantine which we have done and which we hope ICRC can take over soon as suggested by UN. We want second phase inspection to be done by UN teams with on

spot

by:

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William G. Bowdler

RPA:WGBowdler:mrw 11-2-62

ncm

ARA/RPA - Mr. Allen (in draft)

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spot verification. This will take some time because Soviets want to bring in special ships remove equipment. Inspection third phase will involve development of some system enforce keeping out offensive weapons. There are several alternatives involving UN, ICRC, Implementation of pending Brazilian UNGA Resolution on denuclearization or agreement on general disarmament. We have not reached decision and will want consult LA's before doing so.

On discussions with Soviets and Cubans Martin reported these taking place ^{within} ~~in~~ framework Kennedy-Khrushchev letters of October 27 and 28. Other subjects are extraneous and not appropriate. We will not know where we stand on verification until Mikoyan talks with Castro and returns New York. Promised keep in touch with Ambassadors this aspect.

In response questions Martin made following points:

1. Not clear to what extent Soviets will espouse Castro's five points if at all. So far they have not made them conditions to settlement. Will have clearer picture after Mikoyan-Castro talks.
2. Non-invasion pledge related only to present crisis as clearly indicated President's Oct 27 letter and does not affect our OAS commitments under Rio Treaty, 8th MFM decisions, etc. removal of weapons completed we can consider question knowledge further and LA will be consulted.

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We now want to know if the Russians are being tracked.

4. Solution present crisis leaves us with continuing problem of dealing with Castro subversive activities and we understand concern other countries over this menace.
5. Hard to tell how influential Chinese position is as Cuba-USSR difference, but that is their problem. As far as we concerned Chinese not involved in negotiations.
6. Castro has military capacity interfere with implementation of dismantling and removal agreement but no indication he is interposing any objection except to US inspection.
7. Aerial photograph good method of inspection but not perfect. If we are forced decide between aerial and ground inspection to verify Soviet compliance, we will have to consider whole matter further.

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